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STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF l'TAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No. 
vs. 11723 
JOHN RICHARD !\IARK :\llLLER, ) 
Dff enrlant-Appfllant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
John Richard Mark Miller appeals from a conviction 
of b.suing a check against insufficient funds in the Third 
District Com-t, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant, John Richard Mark Miller, was found guilty 
of issuing a cheC'k against insufficient funds by a jury in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. On the 
7th day of April, 1969, appellant appeared before the Hon-
orable Merrill C. Faux, District Court Judge, for sentencing 
2 
and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the inde. 
terminate term as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the judgment of the trial 1:ourt 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts appellant's Statement of Facts but 
feels that it omits the fullowing pertinent facts which are 
essential to a full and accurate account. 
1. AppeUant was informed on January 18th, two 
days after he uttered the check, that the account he had 
written the check on was closed (T. 98). 
2. Appellant did not .go rto the Deseret Inn and offer 
to make the check good (T. 99). 
3. Appellant did not deposit funds in the bank or 
maike arrangements with the bank ito cover the check when 
it was presented (T. 86). 
4. Appellant left :the Stalte knowing he had no funds 
or credit with the drawee bank to cover the check (T. 86, 
T. 99). 
5. It is common knowledge, which this Court can take 
judicial notice of, that Walker Bank & Trust Co., University 
Branch, Salt Lake City, Utah, mainitains outside deposit 
facilities for the convenience of those who wish to make 
deposits to their accounts after banking hours. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
NO ERROR RESULTED FROM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS INVOLV-
ING INTENT TO DEFRAUD. 
Instruction number 10 (T. 20) adequately sets forth 
the governing principle of law in this case. It states that 
a prima facie case of intent to defraud is made out where 
one utters a check knowing that at the time of presentation 
no funds will be in the account to cover it. The instruction 
goes on to explain that this prima facie case of intent to 
defraud can be rebutted by other evidence or discredited 
Ly circumstances, but if it is not it becomes conclusive of 
the fact of guilt. Appellant claims that his requested in-
structions (T. 26 and 27) present a more clear statement 
of the law than the instructions given by the court (T. 19, 
20, 21). The general rule applicable to this situation is: 
"It is not error for a court to refuse to give a 
requested instruction if the subject matter thereof 
is substantially incorporated in the instructions 
given. A party is not entitled to have the jury in-
structed in any particular phraseology and may not 
complain on the ground that his requested instruc-
tions were refused if the court, on its own motion, 
or otherwise, correctly announced the substance of 
the law applicable to the case, and this is true even 
though the requested instructions stated the princi-
ples involved more clearly and definitely than those 
given. PeoplP V. Barber, 62 C. A. 2d 206, 213, 144 
P. 2d 374 (1943). See also the numerous cases 
cited in Par1'fic Digr>st, Vol. 12 § 829 (1)." 
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The Utah Supreme Court is among thosie following the 
above cited general rule. State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 
208, 357 P. 2d 183 (1960). 
The instructions given by the court in the present case 
stated the law in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-
11 (1953), as amended, and State v. Coleman, 17 Utah2d 
166, 406 P. 2d 308 (1965). The instructions the court re. 
fused to give emphasized specific parts of defendant's testi. 
mony. The instructions given by the court allowed the 
jury to consider the factors emphasized in the instructions 
requested by the defense. Instruction number 10 told the 
jury that the prim.a facie casie of intent to defraud, which 
was created by uttering a check at a time when the maker 
knew he did not have funds !in the bank to cover it upon its 
presentment, could be rebutted by other evidence or dis-
credited by the circumstances. Under this instruction, the 
jury was charged to consider all the evidence and circum· 
stances, including the testimony of the appellant. Under 
the instruction, the jury could have found, had it believed 
the evidence appellant offered, that the prima facie case of 
intent to defraud, created by the uttering of the check, had 
been rebutted by appellant's purported subsequent efforts 
to cover it. 
Appellant relies heavily on the Coleman case. In Cole-
man this Court said : 
"It is not to be doubted that the making and 
deliver!ing of a check when the maker does not have 
sufficient funds or credit with the bank to cover it, 
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in the absence of any other proof, is sufficient proof 
to make a prima facie case of intent to defraud as 
Sec. 76..:20-11 provides. However, any dther evidence 
bearing upon the accused's intent must be consid-
ered. For example, even if he did not have suffi-
cient money or credit in the bank at the instant the 
check was made and delivered, if the proof showed 
that he had arranged to have money or credit in the 
bank by the time the check is presented for pay-
ment, that would negate any intent to defraud; and 
the evidence need raise only a reasonable doubt as 
to his having such intent in order to preclude his 
conviction." State V. Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166, 168, 
406 P. 2d 308, 310 (1965). 
The precise holding of Coleman is: where one utters 
a check at a time when he does not have sufficient funds 
in his account to cover it, but subsequent to the time of 
drawing and prior to the time of presentment he deposits 
sufficient funds to cover it, the fact of his making the de-
posit negates any intent to defraud. Appellant made no 
deposit; therefore, the statements of the Court in Coleman, 
supra, are dicta and not controlling under the circumstances 
of the present case. However, instruction number 10 given 
by the court in the present case is in perfect harmony with 
the above cited quotation of the Court. 
POINT II. 
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR RESULTED FROM 
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPEL-
LANT TO TESTIFY AS TO INFORMATION 
CONCERNING HIS CHECKING ACCOUNT RE-
CEIVED FROM A THIRD PARTY. 
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Although the principle of law quoted at the boutom 01 
page 6 of appellant's brief may be an accurate statement 
of law as a general rule, the exclusion of the proffered 
evidence in the present case does not warrant reversal of 
appellant's conviction. Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953) 
provides: 
"After hearing an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regiard to errors or defects which 
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
If error has 'been committed, it shall not be pre-
sumed to have resulted in prejudke. The court must 
be satisfied that it has that effect before it is war-
ranted in reversing the judgment." 
Appellant testified that he was told two days after utter-
ing the check that the account was closed (T. 98), that he 
did not deposit funds in the bank or make 
with the bank to cover the check when i1t was presented (T. 
86), that he did not go to the Deseret Inn and offer to 
make the check good (T. 99), and that he left the state 
knowing he had no funds in or credit with the drawee bank 
to cover the uttered check (T. 86, T. 99). In the context of 
this case, it is difficult to imagine any testimony that ap· 
pellant could have given that would have negated his appar· 
ent intent to defraud. AppeHant attempted to testify as to 
whait Mr. Glad had told him concerning the money appellant 
said he sent with Mr. Glad to deposit to appellant's account. 
Appellant's contention was that the hearsay rule was not 
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applicable to this testimony because it was not offered to 
prove the truth of what Mr. Glad said, but rather as cir-
cumstantial evidence of appellant's state of mind. Appel-
lant contends thait the proffered testimony would have 
shown he acted in good faith in leaving the state without 
covering the check he knew was written on insufficient 
funds. Even were we to assume that the proffered testi-
mony had enough probative value to be relevant in light of 
the other facts already in evidence, the tria.!l judge did not 
abuse his sound discretion in excluding it. A common Law 
rule of evidence which has been codified in California pro-
vides: 
"The court in its discretion may exclude evi-
dence if its probative value is substantiaHy out-
weighed by the probability that its admission will 
... (b) create substantial danger of undue preju-
dice, of confusing the issues or of misleading the 
jury." West's Annotated California Evidence Code, 
§ 352 (1965). 
The comparatively insignificant probative value of the 
proffered testimony coupled with the difficulty the jury 
would have had in considering the proffered testimony not 
for the truth of the facts asserted therein, but only as cir-
cumstantial evidence of appellant's state of mind, support 
the trial judge's ruling excluding the evidence. 
The following language of this Court is as apropoo to 
the present case a::-; to the case from which it was taken: 
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"We are also conscious of the fact that a trial 
in the courts of this state is a proceeding in the in. 
terest of justice to determine the guilt or innocence 
of the accused and not just a game. We will not 
reverse criminal causes for mere error or irregular. 
ity. It is only when there has been error which is 
both substantial and prejudicial to the rights of the 
accused that a reversal is warranted. The <lefen. 
dant was entitled to a full and fair presentation of 
the case to a jury of unbiased citizens and to have 
his rights safeguarded by competent counsel. 
has been done. State V. Neal, 1 U. 2d 122, 126-127, 
262 P. 2d 756, 759 (1953). See also: State v. 
Valdez, 19 U. 2d 426 at page 429, 432 P. 2d 53 at 
page 55 ( 1967) ." 
POINT III. 
THE CHANGE EFFECTUATED IN UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-20-11 (1953) BY THE 1969 
LEGISLATURE DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT 
THE PENALTY AND SENTENCE AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT BE MODIFIED TO CONSTI-
TUTE A MISDEMEANOR. 
Appellant discusses the question of law raised by 
Point III solely from the common law standpoint completely 
ignoring the fact that Utah has a statute governing this 
situation, Utah Code Ann § 68-3-5 ( 1953). 
In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226 ( 1964), the Court 
avoided the real issue of the case (see the opinion of Jus· 
tice Douglas and the opinion of Justices Black, Harlan, and 
White, especially page 321) , and grabbed onto the general 
rule at common law that repeal of a criminal statute re-
quires dismissal of any pending criminal proceeding. iThe 
Court, on page 232 and the following six pages, attempted 
to show that the general saving clause in Maryland prob-
ably would not be applied. The Court had to make this 
showing in order to support its holding, because it recog-
nized that the saving clause statute, if applicable, rwould 
nullify the common law rule. 
Appellant also relies on Pleasant Grove City v. Lind-
say, 41Utah154, 125 Pac. 389 (1912), without mentioning 
that the holding of that case probably would have been 
different had the case involved the repeal of a statute by 
a statute rather than the repeal of an ordinance by a stat-
ute. After setting forth Utah's general saving clause stat-
ute, the Court said at page 162: 
"Similar, if not identical, provisions are found 
in many of the states of the Union, and, so far as we 
have been able to learn, it has universally been held 
by the courts that such provisions were not intended 
to have, and do not have, any application to munici-
pal ordinances, or to any proceeding instituted un-
der them." 
In short, the reason why the judgment in Lindsay was not 
saved by the saving clause is that the savings clause does 
not apply to ovdinances. The present case involves the 
repeal of a statute by a subsequent statute, so the holding 
in Landsn.y is not applicable, but the saving crlause is. 
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The Utah general S'aving clause provides: 
"The repeal of a statute does not revive a stat. 
ute previously repealed, or affect any right which 
has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty in. 
curred, or any action or proceeding commenced un. 
der or by virtue of the statute repealed." Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-5 (1953). 
Acting under a constitutional provision similar in wordina 
e 
to the Utah savings clause above quoted, the Oklahoma 
Criminal Court of Appeals held: 
"The repeal or the amendment of a statute 
prescribing the punishment for an offense after 
final judgment has been pronounced, and while 811 
appeal therefrom is pending, will neither vacate or 
modify such judgment, nor arrest the execution of 
the sentence when there is an aff irmance of the 
judgment and sentence." Alberty v. State, 140 Pac. 
1025, 1031 (Okla., 1914). 
The sentence in the present case is saved by Utah Code 
• Ann. § 68-3-5 ( 1953). Any modification of appellant's 
sentence Lies with the Board of Pardons and Paroles, not 
with this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The rulings of the trial court in refusing some of ap· 
pellant's requested instructions and in excluding some of 
appellant's proffered evidence do not warrant a reversal 
of appellant's conviction. Nor does the change in the law 
11 
subsequent to appellant's conviction and sentencing entitle 
appellant to ibe re-sentenced under the new law. Therefore, 
appeHant's conviction should be affirmed without remand 
for modification. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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